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Are World Trading Rules Passé?
Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly*
ABSTRACT
This Article probes previously under-explored failure of the world
trading rules to keep abreast with the global marketplace. It argues that
the global trading system, despite its well-documented contribution to the
spectacular expansion of postwar trade, has never in fact fully moved away
from the mercantilist past; its mono-linear conception of production and
trading patterns; and its state centric, top-down paradigm of rule making.
The inevitable anachronism precipitated by the out of date trading rules
structure is seriously ill-suited to the contemporary non-territorial
international business transactions defined by global supply chains.
Consequently, while the trading rules officially seek to help facilitate trade
consistent with the theory of comparative advantage, they often entail
diametrically opposite effects, i.e., clogging the arteries of global
commerce. The Article concludes that burgeoning “trade networks” can
offer an answer to these problems as these networks vigorously co-opt
relevant epistemic communities and devise practical tools to confront the
complex challenges faced by global businesses nowadays.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article probes the under-explored failure of the world trading
rules to keep abreast with the global marketplace. It argues that certain
trade rules are out of date, and the means of updating them are out of date as
well. Three factors, inter alia, have led to this impasse: persistent
mercantilism; unacknowledged changing global trade patterns; and a rigid
(top-down) negotiation process for trade rules. As a response to this flaw,
we propose that trading nations mobilize regulatory networks to help the
trade regime keep pace with practical realities. Network actors can work
across issue areas and play a needed problem-solving role to confront
complex trade barriers.
First, while the postwar trade rules embraced the principle of
comparative advantage, they did not fully implement it. In other words, the
Bretton Woods architects, in order to transition from a mercantilist system,
adopted rules which preserved that mercantilist system, at least to some
extent.1 States did not relinquish primarily protectionist stances vis-à-vis
each other but agreed to lower levels of protection through negotiations
over time.2 The transition to free trade has never been fully completed.
True, trade is more open and fewer barriers now exist than the interwar
period. Nonetheless, the current system is still a managed trade system3
with a quid-pro-quo negotiation structure that pits one party against

1

Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the Gatt Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised
Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739, 833 (2001)
(stating that the “principal function of the GATT” was to “preserve the basic principles and
to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system”).
2
Id. (“The GATT is replete with qualifications and exceptions that soften the effect or
limit the reach of even its central tenets.”)
3
Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy--and Back Again: The Fate of the
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 97(2002).
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another.4
Second, the underlying logic of trade rules developed under the old
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the current World
Trade Organization (WTO) was based upon single country production, a
“mono-location production” model of trading patterns, while the
contemporary equivalent is by far more complex as it involves value-added
production in multiple countries, i.e., a “multi-location production” model.5
Until relatively recently, most products were harvested or manufactured
entirely in a single country and shipped to another country.6 Wheat was
produced in Argentina and shipped to England as if Argentina exported and
England imported. Under this unsophisticated trading paradigm, trade
policies were prone to capture by domestic producers as trading nations
competed against each other to maximize net exports (exports minus
imports). Now, the old trade-production model has increasingly become
unsustainable with the advent of new trade realities, such as the global
factory. For example, Indian textiles may be shipped to China, turned into
clothes and eventually exported to the U.S.
Recent technological
innovations and other logistic breakthroughs have facilitated this new trend.
In this new production/trade pattern, global business is “non-territorial, decentralized yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time”!7 Here,
private businesses, not states, are main players. In fact, it is now against any
trading nation’s interest for whatever reasons – be it a financial crisis or a
mercantilist trade policy – to disrupt these tightly-knitted global supply
chains.8 While the global business has acknowledged these changing
4

Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth, How Global Economic Integration Renders Trade
Policy Obsolete, CATO INSTITUTE, TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 42 at 9 (December 2,
2009), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/made-earthhow-global-economic-integration-renders-trade-policy-obsolete.
5
See
Made
in
the
World,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012);
see Paul R. Krugman, The Move Towards Free Trade Zones, in Policy Implications of
Trade and Currency Zones, available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/
1991/S91krugm.pdf (as part of a symposium, Policy Implications of Trade and Currency
Zones, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming on
Aug. 22–24, 1991).
6
Id.
7
John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993); Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free
Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 625,
667 n.187 (2005).
8
Fredrik Erixon, The Twilight of Soft Mercantilism: Europe and Foreign Economic
Power Conference Paper 3 (Beijing, July 2009) (observing that serious disruptions of
global commerce based on dense production networks tend to threaten economic welfare of
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patterns, the trade rules have not.
Third, the framers of the Bretton Woods system (and subsequently
the WTO architects) relied predominantly upon a state-centric, top-down,
treaty-based system to navigate their way out of their mercantilist past. At
the time, this choice made sense. The system generated formal rules
negotiated among states and committed to in a hard law (treaty)
instrument.9 The adoption of a treaty-based regime made it easy to identify
cheaters.10 State-to-state negotiation also aligned well with the old singlecountry production mode of trade: it was relatively easy to barter market
access in the form of tariff concessions under the old trade pattern.
However, this top-down system now struggles to address the complex
problems that stem from trade driven less by the titular “national” interest,
but more by diffused, diverse interests of individual global economic
players located all over the world.11
These three factors combine to create a system that officially claims
to embrace free trade, yet still pits one political interest against another in a
quest to seize protectionist rents.12 In other words, powerful lobbies, such
as domestic producers, capture trade negotiators and replace national
interests with those of their own. They have every incentive to maintain
managed trade and use the rules for their benefit.13 Finally, even where
there is a desire to streamline the trade rules or eliminate barriers to trade,
the system of changing the trade rules based on a state-to-state framework is
out of touch, cumbersome and easily manipulated.14
trading nations).
9
See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t),
99 GEO. L.J. 257, 261 (2011).
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., Richard Eglin, The Doha Round Negotiations on Trade Facilitation in The
Global Enabling Trade Report 2008, 2008 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, available at
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GETR08/Chap%201.2_The%20Doha%20Round%20Ne
gotiations%20on%20Trade%20Facilitation.pdf (discussing the need to address transaction
costs that are imposed on international trade by poor-quality border management and
logistics).
12
The preamble of GATT 1947 describes “the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade” as a purpose of the agreement while Article XXVIII bis lays out the broad
scope of a Contracting Party’s power to negotiate tariff concessions individually, stating
that the “varying needs of individual contracting parties are of great importance . . . .”
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11 at pmbl. & art.
XXVIII bis, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
13
See Brummer, supra note 9, at 282.
14
Dr. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade
Relations, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 775, 776 (1997) (stating that the elimination of trade
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In response, this Article offers a new insight on the global trading
system. The Article questions the traditional state-centered paradigm on
trade. While not entirely debunking the conventional paradigm, it
nonetheless argues in favor of bottom-up solutions to some of vexing trade
problems, in particular those related to customs regulation. Trade networks
formed among issue-specific professionals who work on a variety of trade
problems can offer assistance. Trade networks will be a hybrid of public
and private networks composed of customs officials, transnational
businesses, practitioners, and policy makers. Based on shared knowledge
and beliefs on particular technical issues, these networkers may generate
certain regulatory prototypes (soft law) that can both reflect and guide their
future behaviors in this area. In the long-term, these network activities may
even pave groundwork for future treaty amendments.15
To substantiate our argument, we submit two empirical
confirmations for trade networks. First we explore the network actors who
have coalesced around the related-party “transfer pricing” problem. For at
least 20 years, customs and tax lawyers have confronted complex and costly
customs and tax regulations that prescribe contradictory rules for the exact
same transfer of goods between related companies.16 These practitioners
have formed various networks in which they have attempted to concoct
practical solutions to this problem at multiple national venues as well as the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
the World Customs Organization (WCO). Second, we look at the nascent
trade networks in the recent initiatives on the reform of “trade statistics.” In
conjunction with like-minded academia and other international
organizations, the WTO has recently launched a powerful campaign to
reform the conventional way of formulating trade statistics that has failed to
reflect contemporary global production/trade patterns.17
barriers comes in the form of individual compromise and that internal political interests
tend to weaken and exploit the system).
15
See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Intl. L. 1, 92
(2002).
16
In the United States for example Section 1059A of the Internal Revenue Code has
since 1986 restricted businesses from declaring a greater basis or inventory cost for
merchandise than was declared for the purpose of customs valuation. I.R.C. § 1059A
(1986).
17
See “Made in the World” Initiative: Lamy suggests “trade-in value” as a better
measurement of world trade, WTO.ORG (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Made in the World],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/miwi_06jun11_e.htm.
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Our thesis on trade anachronism and a proposed remedy proceeds in
the following sequence. Part I examines three sources of trade anachronism
that now combine to hamper meaningful progress towards truly free trade.
First, it outlines the rules of managed trade tracing back to the Bretton
Woods architects. The architects needed these rules to manage gradual
trade liberalization negotiated amongst countries. The rules at their core
reflected and preserved a mercantilist system that basically favors export
over import. Part I then recounts the drastic shift in trading patterns and
global integration that has lead to production fragmentation since 1945.
Finally, it describes the traditional preference for a top-down, treaty-based
approach to trade rules. Part II then documents how these three factors
(managed trade, the unacknowledged shift in trading patterns, and a topdown negotiation process) combine to exert mounting tolls within the
global trading system, in particular private businesses, drawing on practical
dilemmas involving such issues as valuation and country of origin rules.
Part III proposes a modest yet workable solution. It notes that while
any amendments of the current trading rules (i.e., the WTO agreements) are
unlikely, the emergence of trade networks can at least alleviate some of the
paralysis caused by trade anachronism. The article concludes that trade
networks may signify a new way of approaching international trade. They
might supply a new mode of conceptualizing trade by breaking the
artificially defined disciplinary divide between international trade law as
embodied in the state centered top-down rules of trade, and the business
level solutions which emerge from epistemic communities trying to find
practical tools to confront complex problems. If we were able to break the
divide between the state level and business level actors in the trade arena,
perhaps we could envision a new way of thinking about international law.
Part IV concludes by analyzing where trade networks might thrive as useful
supplements to the treaty negotiation processes dominating the current trade
regime.
Finally, some words of caution are in order. First of all, this Article
does not argue that the current customs rules are obsolete in their entirety.
One might surmise that the current rules are reasonably effective given that
the global trade volume is ever-increasing. What the Article does contend
is that a certain normative tension nonetheless exists around the new trade
reality, such as global supply chains, due to the anachronism precipitated by
the mercantilist legacy within the trading system. Moreover, the Article
harbors no illusion on the prospects of trade networks. It acknowledges that
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this novel concept still awaits a rigorous theoretical and empirical scrutiny
both on its efficacy and legitimacy. As is widely documents, the network
phenomenon, old and new, is not without controversies.18 At the same
time, however, the trade networks deserve a serious opportunity of being
considered as a policy option to address what the conventional bargaining
model is incapable of tackling. The initial success of networking within the
context of G20 tends to support the position that this Article takes.19
I. THREE SOURCES OF TRADE ANACHRONISM
While the Bretton Woods architects rejected mercantilist policies,
they could not step away from them completely and immediately.
Mercantilism’s goal of expanding national wealth by encouraging exports
protected domestic industries.20 Although the Great Depression proved this
goal a flawed one, the protection afforded to domestic industries with
political power would not be easily relinquished. Truly, trading nations
could not execute free trade in an instant; they had to negotiate it
incrementally.21 The GATT provided the framework to negotiate and
monitor compliance, but the negotiation itself was a vestige of
mercantilism. Each country held onto its protection until it got something
in return.22 States could easily trade “concessions,” i.e., the lessening of
protection, in part, because trade was fairly linear, products moved from
one country to another. But countries no longer trade goods per se; they
instead trade tasks.23 Vertical integration, global sourcing, cross-border
investment and technological innovation combine to create very different
trading patterns than those that existed in 1945.24 Rules tethered to the
18

Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance:
A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 501–05 (2012).
19
Id. at 516-26 (2012) (discussing the network coordination of the G20).
20
Lars G. Magnusson, Mercantilism, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 46–47 (Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle & John B. Davis eds., Blackwell
Publishing Ltd., 2003).
21
CHAD P. BROWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 12–13 (Brookings Institute Press, 2009) (listing the various rounds
of negotiation under GATT and depicting the increasing number of countries and subjects
covered at each round).
22
Id. at 13 (countries used the political trade-off between extending market access
abroad for exporting industries and increased market access granted at home to foreign
industries and thus losses to those industries competing against these imports).
23
GENE M. GROSSMAN & ESTEBAN TOSSI-HANSBERG, Trading Tasks: A Simple
Theory of Offshoring, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1978–1997, 1978 (December
2008); see also Made in the World, supra note 17.
24
Ikenson, supra note 4, at 5.
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1945 trading patterns are a leftover from mercantilist times. Finally, the
global trading regime established a structure to work itself out of managed
trade to free trade. That structure was necessarily a state-centered, treatybased structure. It consisted of rules that bound states to the negotiate
bargain they had made. But that bargain, as already indicated, was a
mercantilist bargain, and the system of binding states is to some extent a
remnant of that age as well.
A. Mercantilist Tools in Pursuit of Free Trade
In its original meaning, mercantilism refers to a set of trade policy
doctrines pervasive throughout Europe mostly in the 17th and the 18th
century.25 Its basic tenets are as follows: (1) a state must expand its national
wealth, and eventually its power,26 by controlling its trade balance
(“Exportation is gain, but all Commodities Imported is loss.”)27; (2) to
discourage imports, a state must protect domestic producers from foreign
competition via tariffs and quotas; (3) to increase the volume of exports, a
state must subsidize domestic producers; (4) a state may increase its exports
only at the expense of another state; and (5) to cultivate colonies is
important since they provide both raw materials for production and export
markets.28
From today’s vantage point, one need not labor to expose
mercantilism’s flaws. 29 The fundamental flaw in the mercantilist theory
25

Magnusson, supra note 20, at 46.
Lars Magnusson, Eli Heckscher and His Mercantilism Today, in ELI HECKSCHER,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 234 (Ronald Findlay et al. eds. 2006)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC HISTORY] (submitting that the ultimate goal of mercantilism was to
maximize the state power).
27
“The Wealth of every Nation consist[s] chiefly in the share which they have in the
Foreign Trade with the whole Commercial World.” CAREW REYNELL, A NECESSARY
COMPANION OR, THE ENGLISH INTEREST DISCOVERED AND PROMOTED 12 (1685) (quoted in
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, MERCANTILISM: POWER AND PLENTY THROUGH THE LENS OF
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY, in ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 26, at 252).
28
James Scott, Mercantilism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GOVERNANCE 560–61 (Mark Bevir
ed., SAGE 2006).
29
Historically, the rise of mercantilism overlapped with that of the centralized and
bureaucratized nation state. Mercantilist policies were essential to absolute monarchs who
desperately needed money to secure their armies and officials. It was no coincidence that
the French Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert espoused mercantilism. Since the
ultimate goal of mercantilism was to augment the national power and in particular, colonies
were instrumental to mercantilism, mercantilist states were destined to clash with each
other (“All trade [is] a kind of warfare.”). ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 26, at 254
(quoting Josiah Child). Beyond a historical fact, this Hobbesian character embedded in
26
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was that trade was a zero-sum game. Mercantilists saw wealth as finite.
There were winners and losers. They failed to recognize that restricting
trade in an attempt to export more and import less actually impeded wealth.
If wealth brings power, adopting mercantilist policies leads to less, not
more, power. Trade in fact is a positive-sum game.30 Adam Smith, David
Ricardo and others clearly showed that free trade could increase wealth for
all countries involved.31 By the end of the eighteenth century mercantilist
doctrine was in decline.32
Then, the tragic collapse of the New York stock market in 1929
heralded the Great Depression.33 Desperate to escape the unprecedented
economic misery, the United States’ government under the Hoover
administration, despite the unified protest of more than 1,000 economists,
passed the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.34 As a striking
reincarnation of mercantilism, the Act raised the import duties of more than
mercantilism is a source for a perennial risk of international conflicts. Malmgren, supra
note, at 143 (observing that “neo-mercantilism will be its scourge, driving nations into
international conflicts”). One might state that mercantilism is destined to generate conflicts
since all economies could not maintain a trade surplus simultaneously. See Paolo Guerrieri
& Pier Carlo Padoan, Neomercantilism and International Economic Stability, 40 Int’l Org.
29, 33 (1986); see also Howard W. Barnes, The Roots of Neo-Mercantilism (Center for
International Business Education and Research, Working Paper No. 999, 1992) (arguing
that mercantilism is not so much a historical incidence as the “motives” of domestic
producers and regulators).
30
See Sungjoon Cho, Trade Is Not about Winners and Losers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2012 (observing that every participant in the project of global trade could potentially be a
winner).
31
Robert Howse, The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to Technocracy--and
Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 94, 94 (Jose
E. Alvarez ed., 2002) (“[T]he modern idea of free trade originates from the theories of
absolute and comparative advantage developed by the classical political economists,
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. . . . . They concluded that, with some qualifications or
exceptions, a policy of liberalizing restrictions on imports would maximize the wealth of
that sovereign.”).
32
Nonetheless, mercantilist policies subsequently re-emerged from time to time. The
British Corn Law of 1815 reflected such recidivism. By the early twentieth century the
mercantilist sentiment had faded into the background. The “roaring Twenties” seemed to
usher in a new era of prosperity. It was in this period that the modern prototype of
globalization had manifested itself. Global trade expanded dramatically and world
business events, such as the Paris Exposition of 1925, represented the triumphant spirit of
world capitalism.
Angus Maddison, Monitoring the world economy, 1820-1992
(Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
1995).
33
See generally JOHN A. GARRATY, THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1986).
34
Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT'L ORG. 179,
179(1988).
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20,000 items35 and immediately invited reciprocal measures from major
trading partners, starting from the United Kingdom.36 The spiral effect of
economic balkanization was indescribable: the world trade had been shrunk
by three-thirds.37 Furthermore, economic miseries bred totalitarianism and
eventually led to the Second World War.38
The mercantilist battle in the interwar period and its tragic
consequences provided trading nations, in particular the Allies, a moment of
enlightenment, which is similar to that emerging among the Founding
Fathers after the collapse of the Articles of Confederation.39 Based on a
Kantian proposition that free trade brings world peace,40 the Allies created
the archetype of the modern global trading system, i.e., GATT with a view
to “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand.”41 The
GATT, as a sovereign contract, was to monitor the tariff reduction
negotiations and more importantly ensure that the result of these
negotiations (tariff concessions) would be preserved.42 In other words,
GATT contracting parties aimed to prevent enhanced market access from
being neutralized by subsequent government measures of importing
countries.
Ironically, however, the GATT in its very architecture betrayed a
mercantilist nature despite its ostensible anti-mercantilist (trade
liberalization) mission. First of all, contracting parties’ way to fight
35

See FRANK W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 498-500
(1931).
36
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PEDDLING PROTECTIONISM: SMOOT–HAWLEY AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION (2011).
37
Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons
from the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNITED
STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003)
(quoting remarks by the former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on the U.S.
trade policy and the WTO on Mar. 2, 2000).
38
Id.
39
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1044 (3d ed., vol. 1, 2000).
40
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in KANT'S
POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 114 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991); see also
Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 76-7
(1992) (observing that “Kant’s views have been confirmed by the success of the European
Economic Community and even by the global system of international trade regulated by
GATT and similar institutions”).
41
GATT, supra note 12, at pmbl.
42
Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence, 4 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 615, 624 (1970).
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mercantilism, i.e., reduce trade barriers (tariffs), was in fact driven by
mercantilist considerations. Tariff reduction negotiations were based on
reciprocal bargains: Country A would cut its own tariffs on goods that
Country B exports to have the latter cut its tariff on goods that the former
exports. In other words, each country’s market opening (tariff concession)
is a price that the country pays to gain its own market access to its trading
partner. Under these circumstances, each trading nation is most eager to
minimize its tariff concessions (cost) and maximize its market access
(benefit). A good negotiator would have his or her counterparts promise to
cut more tariffs while he or she offers little in return. In sum, exports are
virtue and imports vice. This starkly mirrors the mercantilist past.43
The GATT also provided its contracting parties a legal mechanism
to monitor cheating – discriminatory government measures – that would
subsequently neutralize hard-fought tariff concessions. For example, an
importing country could effectively undermine its earlier concession to cut
its tariffs on a certain product by erecting a new import ban on that product
for whatever regulatory reasons. The GATT via its legal obligations, such
as the National Treatment principle,44 would prevent such trade restrictions
from eroding the value of earlier tariff concessions.45 In this sense, legal
obligations under the GATT existed as tools to preserve and facilitate tariff
negotiations.46 Without these safeguards, few incentives would have
43

Of course, multilateralism symbolized by the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) principle
tends to mitigate the mercantilist nature of reciprocal bargains. Even though WTO
members initially conduct reciprocal bargains for tariff reduction on a bilateral basis, the
outcome (tariff cuts) of such bargains is multilateralized “immediately and
unconditionally” under GATT Article I. Therefore, any enhanced market access due to
reciprocal bargains is to be shared with the rest of WTO members that were not parties of
the original (bilateral) bargains. Nonetheless, the value of such newly created market
access might be highest to the original bargainer since that member would not have
initiated the bargain in the first place had the member had no interest in that particular
market access. In other words, the new market access might not be so valuable to other
WTO members absent in the original bargain, at least in the short-term. To this extent, the
logic of tariff negotiations still remains mercantilist. Without mercantilism, most WTO
members could have reduced or eliminated their tariffs unilaterally without any
negotiations.
44
GATT, supra note 12, at art. III.
45
See Report of the Panel, ECC – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, ¶ 148, L/6627 (January 25,
1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 [hereinafter ECC Oilseeds]; see also Report of
the Panel, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 5.1.9,
L/6175 (adopted 17 June 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 34S/136 (1988).
46
Id. (stating that if no legal right to redress were given then parties would be reluctant
to make tariff concessions).
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existed to continue tariff reduction negotiations. Therefore, if a contracting
party (importing country) were ever accused of cheating, a complaining
party (exporting country) would demonstrate the existence of damages, i.e.,
the loss of the latter’s market access that had been guaranteed at the time of
tariff negotiation.47 Just as a private contract, a complainant was supposed
to prove the existence of damages in addition to a defendant’s breach of
certain terms.48 Under the GATT, those damages were the so-called
“nullification or impairments”49 of benefits accruing to the complainant
from tariff concessions.50 In fact, the breach part, i.e., a violation of certain
GATT obligations, was so marginalized that under certain circumstances
even no violation could still entitle the complainant with compensation
from the defendant if the former could prove the existence of damages
(nullification or impairment).51
47

See Report of the Panel, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film
and Paper, ¶ 10.82, WT/DS44/R (adopted April 22, 1998) (explaining that one element of
a claim for nullification or impairment is that the benefit of market access in the form of
tariff concessions is upset by the counterparty).
48
Id. The report further explains that “it is up to the United States [complainant] to
prove that the . . . measures that it cites have upset the competitive relationship . . . .” There
must be a “clear correlation between the measures and the adverse effect . . . .” Id.
49
GATT, supra note 12, at art. XXIII.
50
See e.g., Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural
Machinery, Oct. 23, 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, ¶ 17, 20 (1959) [WTO Doc.
Symbol BISD/75/60]. In this case, the panel focused on “whether the operation of Law No.
949 had caused injury to United Kingdom commercial interests, and whether such an injury
represented an impairment of the benefits accruing to the United Kingdom under the
General Agreement.” Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). The panel recommended that Italy should
eliminate the “adverse effects” which Law No. 949 had caused to the UK. Id. ¶ 20.
51
See generally Sungjoon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework:
Are They the Achilles' Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 311
(1998) (discussing and critiquing non-violation provisions of GATT/WTO dispute
settlement system). See also Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International
Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 763, 766-67 (2004) (discussing the multilateral trading
system (GATT/WTO)’s institutional evolution from a negotiated contract to a legalized
regime). GATT dispute panels fossilized this “nullification or impairment” requirement by
presuming its existence (nullification or impairment) in case of a violation. Thus, when a
complainant establishes that a defendant violated a GATT provision, the former need not
demonstrate separately that such violation also nullified or impaired its benefits accruing
from the GATT. Nonetheless, the mercantilist relic of nullification or impairment resurfaces at a later stage of dispute resolution. Suppose that the defendant refuses to comply
with an Appellate Body report condemning its violative measure. In this situation, the
WTO authorizes the complainant to impose retaliatory tariffs on imported goods from the
defendant to the extent of the formers’ nullified or impaired market access to the latter.51
This retaliatory mechanism might be viewed as a progress from the old GATT in that it
gave the WTO teeth (enforcement).51 Yet, the mechanism still reveals its mercantilist trait
in that its primary operational equation is comprised of exports as utilities (gains) and
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More recently, the deep-rooted mercantilist relic has been painfully
confirmed in the Doha round trade negotiations. The Doha Ministerial
Declaration emphasized that the Doha round is a “development” round that
should focus on eliminating the chronic agricultural protection practiced by
developed countries.52 However, this normative (development) mandate
had quickly evaporated as main stakeholders in developed countries
increasingly considered the Doha mandate as mere charity.53 To most
developed countries, the Doha round is simply yet another “commercial”
deal in which they should increase their access (export) to emerging
markets.54 Under this mercantilist logic, the U.S. conditioned the reduction
of its own agricultural protectionism (such as farm subsidies) on the similar
reduction of other developing countries’ special protection. Importantly,
however, many, if not all, of developing countries (such as China and
India)’s protection derived from “non-mercantilist” purposes (such as food
and livelihood security concerns).55
Perhaps, the mercantilist obsession is inevitable in a representative
imports as disutilities (pains). In other words, upon the WTO’s authorization of
countermeasures the winning party artificially improves its mercantilist leverages by
decreasing the defendant (the losing party)’s exports (gains) and also reducing its own
imports (pains).51 Unfortunately, this mercantilist equation is a mirage. As is well known,
the retaliation would eventually deteriorate the overall economic welfare of the
complainant because any tariff increase tends to inflict pain on its broader business base,
including retailers and consumers.51 The only business that would actually benefit from the
retaliation is those domestic producers competing with their imports. CITE
52
“International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development
and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from
the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates.
The majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and
interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.” Doha
Declaration, supra note _, para. 2 (emphasis added).
53
.See David S. Christy, Jr., ‘Round and ‘Round We Go . . ., WORLD POL’Y J., Summer
2008, at 19, 24 (contending that “affixing the label ‘development’ to the Round may have
warmed a few hearts, but it has not filled any bellies.”); Simon J. Evenett, What Can
Researchers Learn from the Suspension of the Doha Round Negotiations in 2006?, at 5
(Univ. of St. Gallen Discussion Paper No. 2007-17, 2007) (observing that the ambiguous
and confusing “development” mandate of the Doha Round discouraged corporate
executives from attending WTO Ministerial Conference).
54
Political Positioning Dominates Opening Day of WTO Talks, BRIDGES DAILY
UPDATE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), July 22, 2008 [hereinafter Political
Positioning Dominates].
55
.G-6 Ministers Agree to Work to Conclude Doha Round by End of 2007, 11 BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.), Apr. 18, 2007, at 2
[hereinafter G-6 Ministers Agree to Work].
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democracy. Domestic politicians whose electoral success hinges on
parochial interest might not embrace non-reciprocal market opening on
political terms. Even when the Doha round staggers, those politicians
continued to pressure trade negotiators into adhering to mercantilist terms.
For example, Charles Grassley, a powerful U.S. Senator from a farming
state of Iowa urged the U.S. negotiators “pack their bags and come home” if
other trading nations failed to offer the U.S. substantial market access in
agricultural and industrial goods.56
At this juncture, one might be tempted to find in the “public choice”
theory some useful insights as to why mercantilism still prevails. After all,
the modern global trading system emerged from the Kantian moment of
enlightenment triggered by the very same vice, i.e., the interwar economic
balkanization. According to this theory premised on the “politics without
romance,”57 legislators are not “public-regarding guardian angels.”58 They
simply endeavor to maximize their narrow self-interests, such as reelection.
Therefore, a political marketplace simply “reflect[s] a political equilibrium
that in turn reflects the relative strengths of rival groups.”59 Useful as it
may be as a positive theory that provides a rich description of the legislative
process, the public choice theory nonetheless reveals the “glaring gap” in its
normative contribution.60 The characteristic “narrow calculus” of the public
choice theory tends to “implicitly deny[] the capacity of law and politics to
articulate national values and to transform preferences.”61 Just as a purely
mechanistic public choice analysis on the “Civil Rights Act” would
trivialize the Act’s true value,62 an oversubscription to the public choice
56

. Doug Palmer, U.S. Farm Programmes Spared as WTO Talks Collapse, REUTERS,
July 29, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKL950898920080729.
57
J. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory
and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II, at 11 (J. Buchanan
& R. Tollison eds. 1984).
58
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 476 (1988);
Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am. Econ.
Rev. 279, 279 (1984).
59
Macey, supra note 58, at 477. See also A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
258-59 (1967) ("Pressure . . . indicates the push and resistance between groups. The
balance of the group's pressure is the existing state of society.").
60
Id. In fact, even public choice theorists emphasize its “positive” nature. Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev.
263, 263 (1982); Buchanan, Comment, 18 J.L. & Econ. 903, 904-05 (1975).
61
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 321 (1988).
62
Id.
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theory might slight deep-rooted normative failures of mercantilism in the
contemporary trading patterns, as discussed below.
In sum, while the Bretton Woods architects rejected mercantilism in
principle, they had to tolerate it in practice, in order to incrementally
negotiate free trade. Thus, the trade rules and the negotiation process
enshrined some mercantilist stances (e.g., bargaining for concessions and
retaliating for violations). These stances persist despite the fact that the
patterns of global trade change drastically the calculus each nation now
needs to employ to measure its benefits from trade liberalization, as
discussed in the next section.
B. The Path Away from Single Country Production: Changing Trade
Patterns
The economic institutions created at the end of World War II stood
as a framework for future economic integration. International trade patterns
before 1945 were fairly consistent and somewhat stagnant.63 As noted
above, mercantilism did little to stimulate actual wealth. Trade is needed to
create wealth. Yet the early 20th century trade patterns did not look much
different from 18th century trade patterns.64 The Western world exported
manufactured goods while the rest of the world supplied raw materials and
agriculture.65 Prior to 1945, trade, other than colonial trade, had very little
impact on the world economy.66
The Bretton Woods system, in particular the GATT, certainly
contributed to the postwar prosperity. Global economic growth after the
end of World War II was astounding, with GDP growing at 5 per cent on
average between 1950 and 1973: in this period trade actually grew more
rapidly than production.67 The growth in transnational corporations also
tells the tale of increasingly changing patterns of global trade. While
trading companies basically moved goods between domestic markets before
World War II, the postwar economy saw the dramatic rise of those
companies that own and manage assets in multiple countries to produce
63

John Ravenhill, The Study of Global Political Economy, at 3 in John Ravenhill
(ed.), GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY [3rd edition], Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 328. available at http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199570812/ravenhill3e_ch01.pdf
64
Id., at 4-8.
65
Id., at 18-19.
66
Id., at 13-19.
67
Id.
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goods.68 Increases in foreign direct investment have been breathtaking as
well.69
Against this background, the patterns of trade have changed.
Previously, trade was nation to nation, raw materials to manufacturing
bases.70 Throughout the post-war period a shift began that led to the trade
of industrial goods.71 First, this changed in trade occurred amongst
industrialized countries and to a great extent in intra-firm trading,72 but
more recently it has shifted again to integrate the developing world.73 By
the turn of this century, seventy per cent of developing countries’ total
exports accounted for manufactured exports.74 At the same time, one can
see a dramatic shift in the share of world exports from developed countries
to emerging (developing) countries in the period from 1955 to 2006.75
Along this ground-breaking trend has how we think about trade also
changed:
“Long gone are the days when we should be thinking about trade as
a world of “them” and “us” — their exports and our imports, and
vice-versa. We have allowed this way of thinking to miss-specify
the true nature of international trade relations for far too long. It has
created an adversarial mind-set, driven by spurious concern for
reciprocity, thus missing the true nature of our inter-dependency and
the gains from trade among nations.”76
The nature of exported products has changed as well. Exports used
to be finished products made in one country. Throughout the second half of
the twentieth century, and particularly at the turn of this century exported
products were increasingly inputs for other products.77 Manufactured
materials are used in the further manufacturing of goods. Fragmentation of
68

Id., at 18-19.
Id.
70
TAMIN BAYOUMI, CHANGING PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TRADE 6 (discussing the
declining share of commodity trading); Ravenhill, supra note ___ , at 18-19.
71
Ravenhill, supra note 63, at 18-19.
72
Id.
73
Id., at 18.
74
Id.
75
World Trade Report 2008, Trade in a Globalizing World, Globalization and
Trade
at
17
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf.
76
Pascal Lamy, Changes in Trade Challenge How We Manage Trade Policies,
Mar. 16, 2012.
77
Ravenhill, supra note 63, at 18-19.
69
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production in some sectors contributed to this trend.78 Importers and
exports now source from multiple countries, sell in multiple countries and
are themselves incorporated in multiple countries.79 The classical model of
trade in (final) goods should be replaced by trade in (intermediate) tasks80
or trade in value-added.81 Note that even in the United States (not China),
nearly a half of all imported goods are not directly headed to consumers but
streamed into supply chains and often re-exported after further processing.82
Reflecting this unprecedented trend, trading companies even rely on
computer software designed exclusively for supply chain management
(“product lifecycle management”) to optimize their sourcing decisions.83
For example, Boeing has planned to source nearly a half of all components
for its new 787 aircraft from foreign countries, while Airbus, Boeing’s
European rival, has planned to source to the same extent for its new A380
aircraft from none but U.S. suppliers!84 Nowadays, this phenomenon of
global sourcing, carrying varying labels with it, such as “unbundling,85
“trade in tasks,”86 or “trade in value-added,”87 is no longer a mere subject of
78

World Trade Report 2008, Trade in a Globalizing World, Globalization and Trade at
18
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf.
(parenthetical)
79
BAYOUMI, supra note 70, at 6 (discussing trade interconnecdedness).
80
Lamy Says More and More Products Are “Made in the World,” WTO News:
Speech, Oct. 15, 2010; See generally WTO & Ide-Jetro, Trade Patterns and Global Value
Chains in East Asia: From Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks.
81
See Andreas Maurer, Made In The World, Trade in value added: what is the country
of
origin
in
an
interconnected
world?
Available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/background_paper_e.htm (noting that
the concept of trade in value added is more than a mere statistical change, it is a change
that implicates trade policy.)
82
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Operations of
Multinational Companies, Product Guide for Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 2002
Benchmark Survey, "U.S. Imports of Goods Shipped to Affiliates and Intended Use.";
Doug Karmin, Imports as Inputs, PPI | Front & Center, Jan. 5, 2009.
83
See e.g., PLM software takes off in apparel supply chain (24 July 2008 | Source:
just-style.com), http://www.just-style.com/article.aspx?id=101477.
84
Barry Lynn, The Trade Row over Aircraft Is Missing the Point, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 3,
2005. See also John Gapper, A Cleverer Way to Build a Boeing, Fin. Times, Jul. 9, 2007,
at 9 (reporting Boeing’s recent efforts for global sourcing).
85
Baldwin, Richard E. (2006), GLOBALISATION: THE GREAT UNBUNDLING(S)., in
GLOBALISATION CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE, Helsinki: Office of the Prime Minister of
Finland
86
Gene M. Grossman, Fragmentation of Global Production and Trade in ValueAdded, Panel Discussion at World Bank Workshop, Jun. 9-10, 2011, at 2.
87
OECD & WTO, Trade in Value-Added: Concepts, Methodologies, and Challenges,
Jun.6, 2011
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admiration. One must no longer equate “production” as “manufacturing”
that is only a partial stage of the former in the new trade pattern.88
These revolutionary changes characterized by global supply chains
challenge the conventional territoriality-based production patterns. In fact,
some scholars such as John Ruggie witnessed this transformative
phenomenon nearly two decades ago. Ruggie observed that:
Consider the global system of transnationalized microeconomic links.
Perhaps the best way to describe it, when seen from our vantage point, is
that these links have created a nonterritorial "region" in the world economya decentered yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which
exists alongside the spaces-of-places that we call national economies.89
In a historical verdict for Ruggie’s clairvoyance, the unprecedented
innovations in the transportation, telecommunication and other logistical
fields have revolutionized the new production pattern. The proliferation of
global sourcing or global supply chains (“multi-location” production)90 in
tandem with capital market liberalization has witnessed diversified trade
interests among various groups of economic players, including not only
exporters and importers but also retailers, wholesalers, distributors, bankers,
forwarders, shippers and consumers.91 As one commentator aptly observes,
“the distinction between what is and what isn’t American or Finnish or
Chinese has been blurred by foreign direct investment, cross-ownership,
equity tie-ins, and transnational supply chains.”92
In sum, in this “postnational constellation,” as Jürgen Habermas put
it, in which non-territorial entities are more inclined to communicate, rather
than compete, with each other, the old realist-mercantilist paradigm
becomes increasingly obsolete.93 The anachronistic gap between an altered
88

Henrik Isakson, Adding Value to the European Economy: How Anti-Dumping Can
Damage the Supply Chains of Globalised European Companies (Swedish National Board
of Trade), at 30.
89
John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 172 (1993).
90
Made in the World; Message from the Director-General Pascal Lamy, WTO MIWI
HOMEPAGE (April 4, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm.
91
Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth: How Global Economic Integration Renders Trade
Policy Obsolete, Trade Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, Dec. 2, 2009 at 5 available at
http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/made-earth-how-global-economicintegration-renders-trade-policy-obsolete.
92
Id. ,at 5.
93
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 176 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2006) (“In
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social context and a maladaptive paradigm is taking a mounting toll on the
world trading system.
Technology, political forces and liberalized
economic policies have promoted trade integration and source diversity.94
All of these events have drastically changed the 1945 picture of trade. The
trade rules however, have failed to keep up.95 Part of this failure stems
from how they are established in the first place, as discussed in the next
section.
C. Top-Down Law Making in an Increasingly Bottom-Up World
International law, and certainly international trade law has by and
large been the product of state-center, top-down treaty making. The treaty
making process has its costs and benefits that have been more than
adequately explained by others.96 In short:
[A] treaty-making process requires an enormous amount of
diplomatic and political effort in order to reach both consensus and
compromise among the parties concerned. Lobbies from interested and
affected constituencies are legion. Naturally, it is not only a painstaking
but also a treacherous process. Often, the process loses its initial passion
or momentum as it develops. Moreover, a treaty’s legally “binding”
nature tends to make negotiating parties reluctant to nail down any
definite texts, because they want to leave themselves enough flexibility
for future contingencies. Likewise, treaties are often accompanied by
reservations, understandings, and declarations that practically qualify
spatial, social, and material respects, nation-states encumber each other with the external
effects of decisions that impinge on third parties who had no say in the decision-making
process. Hence, states cannot escape the need for regulation and coordination in the
expanding horizon of a world society that is increasingly self-programming, even at the
cultural level.”)
94
World Trade Report 2008, Trade in a Globalizing World, Globalization and Trade at
20-22
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf.at
(parenthetical)
95
BAYOUMI , supra note 70, at 11 (with rising vertical specialization and intraindurty
trade, gross exports may not appropriately capture the extent of domestic value added
exports).
96
See Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
579 (2005) (Discussing the costs and benefits of potential design elements in international
agreements); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010)
(discussing the costs and benefits of hard law and soft law instruments).
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their initial legal effects. Finally, just as a treaty-making process is
tortuous, so is its amending process. Therefore, a regulatory treaty, once
fixed, is hard to keep abreast of the subsequently changing regulatory
environment.97
The difficulties of treaties stems from what is perceived as a benefit:
the creation of hard law. For example, states may believe that compliance
mechanisms will only be useful where there is hard treaty law as opposed to
soft norms.98 States may also perceive trade regulation as purely a public
law issue focusing on the rules which bind states as states, and discounting
the importance of the private sector.
In other areas of law such as financial regulation the use of soft law
and the participation of the market is more common, and in fact,
encouraged. 99 Chris Brummer has explained part of the popularity of
treaties “lies in the democratic trappings.”100 For trade, in particular
though, treaties address a problem of trust and the need for hard law to lock
participants in to obligations compliance with which can be objectively
monitored. They are capable of:101
[M]aking commitments to liberalization more credible and by
developing institutions that make defections from commitments more
costly. Because treaties require significant levels of governmental
involvement, including leadership by heads of state and usually
ratification by legislatures, states may face considerable reputational
costs where they do not honor their treaty obligations. Simply put, states
that tend to honor their commitments develop strong reputations that
help them coordinate with parties when they need to advance their
national interests. On the other hand, where countries fail to honor their
commitments, they send a signal that they cannot be trusted, and thus
gain reputations that hamper their future prospects for cooperation from
and with others. 102

97

Cho and Kelly, supra note 18 at 497-98.
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 718
(2010) (noting that treaties often create the mechanisms for resolving disputes).
99
Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And not
Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 624 (2011).
100
Id., at 624.
101
Id., at 624-25.
102
Id., at 625.
98
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In general, the hard law (treaty) mechanism appears justifiable in
binding trading nations’ liberalization commitments. Nonetheless, certain
aspects of treaty-making process, such as a top-down, state-centered
approach, may not be as adequate in some areas of trade law, in particular
those areas requiring sophisticated, technical regulations such as customs
regulations. While one might argue that trade, as compared with finance, is
more stable and therefore less in need of flexible soft law approaches, that
argument has weaknesses.103 True, while shifting trade patterns may move
more slowly than financial markets,104 they still move fast enough to make
the treaty and treaty amendment process overly cumbersome and
ineffective. Certain (although not all) areas of trade law, such as customs
regulations, could particularly benefit from flexible and informal soft law
commitments that allow innovation without explicit delegations and high
sovereignty costs. Trade regulators and domestic legislators share the same
angst as financial regulators in committing to complex rules ex ante in an
uncertain world. Soft law commitments may sacrifice some potential
compliance pull, but they may nonetheless allow regulators and innovators
to overcome their initial angst in developing rules.105 Financial regulation
may be particularly well-suited for soft law approaches as it is technical and
complex, 106 but so are some areas of trade law. Classification and
valuation are enormously complex endeavors that are only understood by a
handful or practitioners, bureaucrats and industry experts.107
Finally, the global trade regime needs innovative bottom-up
approaches as the top-down statist model has increasingly become ill-suited
for many of the challenges facing the trade regime. Under the new (multilocation production) model characterized by global supply chains, the old
bargain-oriented model loses its relevance. Here, the conventional concern
for reciprocity becomes “spurious,” as the head of the WTO Pascal Lamy
aptly observed.108 Under the old (mono-location production) model, it was
103

Id., at 636-37.
Id., at 637.
105
Kenneth W. Abott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 439 (2000).
106
Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates supra note 99, at 636-37.
107
Admittedly, one important difference between the finance and trade realms is
the industry motivations for a bottom-up approach. In financial regulation the industry
may push for bottom-up approaches. The trade industry may do the same, but the trade
industry is split into importers and exporters where the financial industry tends to be a
more homogenous group.
108
Pascal Lamy, Changes in Trade Challenge How We Manage Trade Policies,
Mar. 16, 2012.
104
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clear where an imported product originated.109 Thus, domestic producers
would easily target an exporting state and lobby an importing state into
imposing trade barriers, such as tariffs, against the foreign product from that
exporting state. As most trading nations were prone to this mercantilist
politics, the conventional modus operandi of trade negotiation was mutual
tariff reduction based on reciprocal bargain. 110 The quantifiable nature of
tariffs was also instrumental to this operation.
Under the new trade reality, however, more than half of global
exports in manufactured products are in fact inputs (parts and components)
to other unfinished goods.111 Under this altered situation that befits the new
model, not only has it become difficult to locate an origin of a particular
product but also consuming industries’ interest has increasingly countered
domestic producers’ lobbying power. At the same time, one should take the
changing nature of trade barriers seriously. The titular administrative
barriers, i.e., various domestic regulations, have recently replaced the
traditional mode of trade barrier, i.e., tariffs, which are generally in decline
after a series of trade rounds.112 Critically, these non-tariff barriers tend to
exert multiple impacts to trade when these barriers arise at an early
(upstream) stage in the global production chain.113 In other words, such
barriers “will have an augmented impact every time affected components or
services cross a frontier.”114
II. EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATIONS OF TRADE ANACHRONISM: VALUATION AND
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN RULES
The relics of the mercantilist system obstruct the trade regime’s ability
to address complex challenges of global trade. As a result of changing
global trade patterns the rules relating to, inter alia, valuation,115 customs
109

Regis McKenna, Technology, Enterprise, and Freedom, in THE TECHNOPOLIS
PHENOMENON: SMART CITIES, FAST SYSTEMS, GLOBAL NETWORKS, 19, 22 (David V.
Gibson, George Kozmetsky, and Raymond W. Smilor eds., 1992).
110
J. Michael Finger et al., Market Access Bargaining in the Uruguay Round:
Rigid or Relaxed Reciprocity? 2-4 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
2258, 1999).
111
Pascal Lamy, Trade Improves the Lives of People, Apr. 12, 2012.
112
See Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy
Transparency, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 371 (2006) (viewing that democracy reduces
incentives to employ tariffs while increasing incentives to employ less transparent NTBs).
113
Pascal Lamy, Changes in Trade Challenge How We Manage Trade Policies,
Mar. 16, 2012.
114
Id.
115
See also Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth: How Global Economic Integration
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clearance,116 product standards,117 and country of origin,118 all contain
anachronistic components that often become trade barriers themselves under
new trade realities. Addressing these complexities in the typical top-down,
state-centered forum offers little hope of a solution. Here, we explain the
customs valuation and country of origin rules which preserve the
mercantilist relic of tariff protection. We then detail how valuation of
related-party transfers, a common necessity with emergence of the global
factory, creates new barriers to trade. Likewise, the amorphous and
confusing country-of-origin rules hamper free trade because they fixate on
identifying a single country of origin even though as a practical matter
many products have significant value added in different source countries.
The complexity, uncertainty and manipulability of some origin rules highly
distort trade incentives.
A.

Valuation

The trade regime provides a system by which products are assigned
a value so that duties may be levied when they pass through national
customs. In 1979, as part of the Tokyo Round negotiations, the contracting
parties adopted the GATT Valuation Code which was later incorporated
into the WTO, although changed slightly, with the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 (Valuation
Agreement).119
The Valuation Agreement establishes principles of
Renders Trade Policy Obsolete, Trade Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, Dec. 2, 2009 at 8
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/made-earth-how-globaleconomic-integration-renders-trade-policy-obsolete (noting the misleading nature of terms
such as “import value.”)
116
Andrew Grainger, Customs And Trade Facilitation: From Concepts To
Implementation,
World
Customs
Journal,
Vol.
1
at
17
http://www.worldcustomsjournal.org/media/wcj/2008/1/customs_and_trade_facilitation_fr
om_concepts_to_implementation.pdf.
117
Product standards, in an increasingly integrated world, could easily become
significant trade barriers. As Robert Howse has argued there is a “common critiques of
globalization is that it increasingly constrains the ability of democratic communities to
make unfettered choices about policies that affect the fundamental welfare of their
citizens.” Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329 (2000). Howse’s thoughtful
response is that the trade rules should be used to “enhancing the quality of rational
democratic deliberation about risk and its control.” Id. at 2330.
118
Made in the World; Message from the Director-General Pascal Lamy, WTO MIWI
HOMEPAGE (April 4, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm.
119
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Group "Non-Tariff Measures" Sub-Group
"Customs Matters," Customs Valuation: Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of
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appraising merchandise,120 i.e., setting a unit value of the merchandise at the
time of importation so that duty can be calculated for the merchandise.121
Establishing standard principles to value merchandise matters since most,
but not all, tariffs are expressed as an ad valorem charge, i.e., they are a
certain percentage of value.
The Valuation Agreement provides several permissible methods of
appraisement, but generally speaking, appraisement should be based on
“transaction value,” which is “the price paid by the buyer to the seller for
the goods when they are sold for exportation.”122 In reality, however, fixing
a single transaction value is more daunting than this ostensibly self-evident
definition. For example, any given “transaction” between an exporter and
an importer may involve several intermediate steps. Or, such a transaction
may be somewhat different from a normal situation due to a special
relationship between an exporter and an importer. Therefore, the agreement
also specifically lists certain “adjustments” to this value.123
In particular, where the buyer and seller are “related,” transaction
value may still be used, although the importer must demonstrate that it is
appropriate to do so.124 The importer may demonstrate that the value was
not influenced by the relationship (i.e., that it was an arms-length sale) by
using either a “circumstances of the sale” test or another method of
appraisement as a test value.125 For example, Acme Co. in the United
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, [Revision], MTN/NTM/W/229/Rev.1 (Apr.
9, 1979). Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Valuation Agreement].
120
Id., arts. 1 - 7.
121
Id., art. 1.
122
Id.
123
For example, where an importer provides an “assist” (i.e., some component or
object used in the production of the good) free of charge or at a reduce cost the value of
that assist not included in the transaction value must be added. Assists include things such
as components, parts and similar items incorporated in the imported goods but they also
include engineering work undertaken elsewhere than in the country of importation. See
Marrakesh Valuation Agreement at Article 8(1).
124
Marrakesh Valuation Agreement, supra note 119, art. 1 (2).
125
Id., art. 1(2), 19 USC 1401a(b)(2)(B). The Statement of Administrative Action
(SAA) for the TAA provides with respect to the circumstances of the sale::
“. . . the Customs Service will examine relevant aspects of the transaction, including
the way in which the buyer seller organize their commercial relations and the way in
which the price in question was arrived at, . . . If it is shown that the buyer and seller,
although related, buy and sell to each other as if they were not related, this will
demonstrate that the price has not been influenced by the relationship and the
transaction value will be accepted.” "Statement of Administrative Action," H.R. Doc.
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States may buy and import computers from its related entity Best Co. in
Portugal. It may supply Best Co. with LCD screens from another related
affiliate Computer Co., in Singapore. Further, it may supply engineering
work to Computer Co. The engineering work might have been produced in
both United States and Portugal. Acme would probably be able to use the
transaction value method of appraisement if it could show that the
circumstances of the sale warranted it (that it was an arms-length
transaction).126 It would declare the value paid to Best Co. plus the value of
the LCD screens, plus the value of the engineering work done in any
country other than United States.127
No. 153, 96 Cong., 1st Sess., Pt II, at 449 (1979). Specific examples are given and
they include “that the price is settled in a manner consistent with the normal pricing
practices of the industry in question, or with the way the seller settles prices with
unrelated buyers; or, the price is sufficient to ensure recovery of all costs plus a profit
equivalent to the firm's overall profit over a representative period of time in sales of
merchandise of the same class or kind. "Statement of Administrative Action," H.R.
Doc. No. 153, 96 Cong., 1st Sess., Pt II, at 449 (1979).
126
Marrakesh Valuation Agreement, supra note 119, art. 1(2)(b).
127
Id., art. 8. In determining the customs value under the provisions of Article 1, there
shall be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods:
(a)

(b)

the following, to the extent that they are incurred by the buyer but are not
included in the price actually paid or payable for the goods:
(i)

commissions and brokerage, except buying commissions;

(ii)

the cost of containers which are treated as being one for customs
purposes with the goods in question;

(iii)

the cost of packing whether for labour or materials;

the value, apportioned as appropriate, of the following goods and
services where supplied directly or indirectly by the buyer free of charge
or at reduced cost for use in connection with the production and sale for
export of the imported goods, to the extent that such value has not been
included in the price actually paid or payable:
(i)

materials, components, parts and similar items incorporated in
the imported goods;

(ii)

tools, dies, moulds and similar items used in the production of
the imported goods;

(iii)

materials consumed in the production of the imported goods;

(iv)

engineering, development, artwork, design work, and plans and
sketches undertaken elsewhere than in the country of
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The problem, however, is that the current Valuation Agreement has
become increasingly unbefitting to the contemporary trade practices. In a
multi-country sourcing production pattern, a product crosses multiple
borders back and forth in various stages as it gradually adds value and
reaches its final form.128 Moreover, a number of service transactions
(engineering, advertisement, intellectual property) are added throughout the
life-cycle of such a globally sourced product.129 The Valuation Agreement
basically determines value under a single-country production model and
raises numerous problems to global businesses that are exporters and
importers even regarding one single product. One recent report on the
global supply chain of the iPhone 4 explained that it contains numerous
different components from around the world.130 The breakdown of
component costs is revealing:
Apple, for instance, pays Samsung about $27 for flash memory and
$10.75 to make its (Apple-designed) applications processor; and a German
chip maker called Infineon gets $14.05 a phone for chips that send and
receive phone calls and data. Most of the electronics cost much less. The
gyroscope, new to the iPhone 4, was made by STMicroelectronics, based in
importation and necessary for the production of the imported
goods;
(c)

royalties and licence fees related to the goods being valued that the buyer
must pay, either directly or indirectly, as a condition of sale of the goods
being valued, to the extent that such royalties and fees are not included in
the price actually paid or payable;

(d) the value of any part of the proceeds of any subsequent resale, disposal or use of
the imported goods that accrues directly or indirectly to the seller.
128
Robert C. Johnsony and Guillermo Noguera Accounting for Intermediates:
Production Sharing and Trade in Value Added (May 2011) available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/InternalTraining/287823-1256848879189/6526508-1283456658475/73701471308070299728/7997263-1308070314933/PAPER_4_Johnson_Noguera.pdf (“Trade in
intermediate inputs accounts for as much as two thirds of international trade”).
129
Robert C. Johnsony and Guillermo Noguera Accounting for Intermediates:
Production Sharing and Trade in Value Added (May 2011) available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/InternalTraining/287823-1256848879189/6526508-1283456658475/73701471308070299728/7997263-1308070314933/PAPER_4_Johnson_Noguera.pdf At 23 (“The
upshot is that Services are far more exposed to international commerce than one would
think based on gross trade statistics.”)
130
Supply Chain for iPhone Highlights Costs in China available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/technology/06iphone.html.
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Geneva, and added $2.60 to the cost. The total bill of materials . . .is
$187.51, according to iSuppli.
But the ad valorem duties are based on specific trading bargains
made between countries for specific products and assume a single country
production situation. The customs value does not reflect in what countries
value was added.
Increasingly prominent conflicts of valuation rules with other
regulatory considerations, such as international taxation, further compound
the aforementioned inadequacy.
Unsurprisingly in a related-party
transaction, such as the one described above, customs authorities might be
concerned that importers like Acme Co. might deflate the value of the
goods in order to pay lower customs duties.131 But in addition to dealing
with customs valuation, MNEs, like Acme Co., worry about corporate
taxation.132 For corporate tax purposes however, the state taxing authority
typically has the reverse concern, namely that the importer is declaring too
high a value to show a high cost of goods resulting in lower corporate
taxation. The problem is complicated by the fact that each country has its
own rules for protecting against perceived vulnerabilities for both corporate
and customs taxes.133
For example, the United States has Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code which permits the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate
income amongst related companies.134 The IRS will only reallocate if it
131

Michael E. Murphy & Holly E. Files, The Intersection of Transfer Pricing and
Customs Valuations: Challenges (and Opportunities) for Multinational Enterprises, 15
SWEET & MAXWELL'S INT’L TRADE LAW & REGULATION (Issue 5) 149 (Sept. 2009); Nick
Raby, International Transfer Pricing, PriceWaterhouseCoopers International Limited
(2010); Ganapati Bhat, Transfer Pricing, Tax Havens, and Global Governance, German
Development Institute (July 2009).
132
Id.
133
Global
Tax
Report,
January
(2010)
available
at
www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/f07f85db-a407-4e34-9329ef62eb0f2607/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bd2018e9-cf46-45ed-bc9bf663fe086ea8/newsletters-Tax-GlobalTaxReport-Jan10-v12.pdf .
134
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 482, I.R.C. § 482. “In any case of two or more organizations,
trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within
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finds that the transfer price was not arms-length, i.e., if the results would
have been the same if the taxpayers were not related. There are several
methods by which the taxpayer could set transfer prices (comparable
uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plus, comparable profits method, and
profit split) and the taxpayer is suppose to use the “best method” (i.e., the
one that would most reliably reflect an arm’s length transaction).135 The
taxpayer will bear the burden of proof that any determination by the IRS is
incorrect. 136 There are significant penalties for the failure to properly set
transfer prices resulting in a Section 482 adjustment.137
MNEs have faced the possibility of inconsistency between their
transfer prices for tax and customs purposes for years.138 The inconsistency
results not only from the very nature of the problems that taxing and
customs authorities face (i.e., concerns over-valuation for tax purposes and
under-valuation for customs purposes, respectively) but also from different
applications of their respective rules. For example, the IRS “does not focus
on correct valuation, but only that the ultimate result of any underpayments
and overpayments achieves the proper income result.”139 Moreover the
agencies determine the transfer price at different times: customs value
goods upon entry, while taxing authorities wait until the end of a reporting
the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license
shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.”
135
Section 482-1 (c) of the transfer pricing regulations:
(c) Best method rule--(1) In general. The arm's length result of a
controlled transaction must be determined under the method that, under
the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an
arm's length result. Thus, there is no strict priority of methods, and no
method will invariably be considered to be more reliable than others. An
arm's length result may be determined under any method without
establishing the inapplicability of another method, but if another method
subsequently is shown to produce a more reliable measure of an arm's
length result, such other method must be used. Similarly, if two or more
applications of a single method provide inconsistent results, the arm's
length result must be determined under the application that, under the
facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm's
length result. See Sec. 1.482-8 for examples of the application of the best
method rule. See § 1.482–7 for the applicable method in the case of a
qualified cost sharing arrangement.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (2012)
136
Tax Ct. R. 142
137
See Section 6662(e) and (h).
138
Murphy and Files, supra note 131, at 149 (Sept. 2009).
139
William M. Methenitis & Steven C. Wrappe, The Growing Need for Harmonization
of Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation, 17 TAX MNGT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. (No.
8) (BNA) S3, S9 (Aug. 28, 2008).
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period.140 The taxing authority typically allows for aggregation while
customs authorities do not.141
Perhaps the biggest problem for MNEs is not the different
application of the rules but measures that government take to ensure that
taxpayers do not whipsaw the government. For example, Section 1059A in
the United States to prevents importers from claiming a higher basis on
their taxes than the “dutiable” customs value of their merchandise.142 Thus,
it thwarts the taxpayer who would attempt to use the different rules under
each system from declaring a low value for customs duty purposes and a
high value for tax basis deductions.143
The rule has unintended side
effects. For example, it undermines the usefulness of otherwise legitimate
transfer pricing studies or Advance Pricing Agreements in the tax regime.144
Tax authorities regularly accepted transfer pricing studies to account for
post importation price changes. Customs authorities, until recently, were
far less open to such studies.
Moreover, Section 1059a is incapable of addressing the converse
possibility that a taxpayer may pay duty on a high transfer price and yet be
saddled with a low transfer price for tax basis purposes. If the value of a
product increases after importation, the importer might have to pay more
duty, but it will be precluded from increasing its basis for tax purposes by
1059A. Conversely, the price decreases after importation, the importer may
be required to decrease its tax basis but would have no mechanism to
decrease its customs liability (because any post-importation decrease in
price is generally considered a rebate and irrelevant for customs valuation
purposes). In other words 1059A prevents the government from being
whipsawed by the taxpayer, but does nothing for the taxpayer who might be
whipsawed by the government.145
140

Lui Ping & Caroline Silberztein, Transfer Pricing, Customs Duties, and VAT Rules:
Can We Bridge the Gap, 1 WORLD COMMERCE REVIEW (Issue 1) 36, 37 (2007).
141
William M. Methenitis & Steven C. Wrappe, The Growing Need for Harmonization
of Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation, 17 TAX MNGT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. (No.
8) (BNA) S3, S10 (Aug. 28, 2008).
142
See Brittingham v. Comr., 66 TC 373 (1976) aff’d 598 F2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979).
143
Section 1059A permits certain adjustments and does not apply in cases where the
goods would be entered duty-free in any event.
144
Mayra O. Lucas Mas, Section 1059A: An Obstacle to Achieving Consistent
Legislation?, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/26/42867242.pdf
145
See Marc M. Levey & Robert L. Eisen, The Transfer Pricing And Customs Duties
Practice In The United States, 947 PLI/Tax 299-1: “On its face, Section 1059A appears to
align the values used for both tax and customs by prohibiting an importer from claiming a
higher tax basis for imported merchandise than it claims for customs purposes. However,
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In sum, the current valuation rules become increasingly unsuitable
to the contemporary trade realities. Furthermore, in today’s complex world
of MNEs the rules may conflict with other concerns such as international
taxation rules. The trade regime alone, based on the conventional treatymaking mode, appears to be ill-equipped to address such conflicts.
B.

Rules of Origin

Rules of origin are essential to preserve the mercantilist bargain of
managed trade. Rules of origin, like valuation rules, are required in order to
apply duty rates. There are two types of rules: Non-preferential (which
apply in the ordinary course where there is no claim of special treatment
under a regional trade agreement (RTA)) and preferential (which are
applied when special treatment is claim under an RTA). Non-preferential
rules of origin were meant to protect bargain trade amongst GATT
members. All GATT (and subsequently WTO) countries were entitled to
the same tariff rate under the most favored nation (MFN) principle.146
Thus, a product of a GATT or WTO got the benefit of the negotiated
bargain while a non GATT or non WTO might not.147 Countries would use
“non-preferential” rules of origin to determine whether products were
entitled to the MFN rate.
Preferential Rules of origin allow countries to favor certain countries
by according better market access (such as zero tariffs) to imports from
these countries. This discriminatory mechanism is a must in administering
a RTA.148 In other words, RTAs are sustainable only when RTA members
can screen out those goods from member countries eligible for duty-free
treatment from those from non-member countries still subject to tariffs
the actual application of Section 1059A is significantly more complicated, and any
apparent similarities drawn between the two systems veil important differences,
particularly for timing. Indeed, the tax basis under Section 1059A may differ from a
customs value because of legitimate differences between the tax and customs valuation
rules. Customs value may allow for increases in imported values by freight charges;
insurance charges; construction, assembly and technical assistances after importation; and
any other amounts not included in the customs value which are appropriately included in
cost basis for income tax purposes.” Id. at 299-18.
146
GATT, supra note 12, art. 1.
147
Id.
148
See Moshe Hirsch, Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments?: The
European Union Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 572, 574-76 (2003).
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How an importing country determines where a particular import
originated was not addressed in GATT 1947.149 In 1994 the WTO
established the Agreement on the Rules of Origin (ROO) to ameliorate this
deficit.150 Under the WTO ROO Agreement, the country of origin:
Is either the country where the good has been wholly obtained or,
when more than one country is concerned in the production of the good, the
country where the last substantial transformation has been carried out.151
Some version of the “substantial transformation” test has been used
for non-preferential rules of origin in the United States and the European
Union for some time. In the United States, a substantial transformation
occurs when by means of manufacture a new and different article emerges,
“having a distinctive name, character, or use.”152 Thus, mere assembly of
parts will not result in a substantial transformation.153 What will suffice is a
contextual matter determined on a case by case basis.154 They may
incorporate the substantial transformation test but also add local content
requirements (U.S. GSP rules),155 or they may require conformity with
complex “tariff shifts”156 as do the rules of origin for the NAFTA.157
149

“The draftsmen of the General Agreement stated that the rules of origin should be
left:
“...within the province of each importing country to determine, in accordance with the
provisions of its law, for the purpose of applying the most-favoured-nation provisions (and
for other GATT purposes), whether goods do in fact originate in a particular country”.”
See
Technical
Information
on
Rules
of
Origin
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm
150
Agreement
On
Rules
Of
Origin,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm. These rules only attempt to
harmonize “non-preferential” rules of origin and thus do not cover “preferential” origin
rules for free trade areas or the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) system.
151
Id., art 3 (emphasis added)
152
U S v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., Inc., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (1940).
153
See T.D. 76-100, 10 Cust. Bull. & Dec. 176, 178 (1976); Texas Instruments v.
United States, 2 C.I.T. 36, 520 F. Supp. 1216, rev'd, 681 F.2d 778 (CCPA 1982)
154
Cf. Bestfoods v. U.S., 165 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (addressing whether the
NAFTA rules abrogated the case by case substantial transformation test for origin).
155
See 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1996).
156
“Tariff Shifts” require that “for any given classification, to change the country of
origin of a . . . product there must be a shift from one Harmonized Tariff System (HTS)
classification to another as listed in the tariff shift rules and/or the processing which occurs
must meet any other requirement that is specified in the tariff shift rules.” What Every
Member of the Trade Community Should Know About: Textile & Apparel Rules of Origin,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, An Informed Compliance Publication
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The preferential rules of origin explicitly support a mercantilist
bargain. As “gate keepers” that sustain the discriminatory trading
mechanism, origin rules are a “strategic” instrument to restrict import
competition.158
They create new trade barriers by limiting, often
prohibitively, foreign producers’ sourcing options in manufacturing final
imported products.159 Preferential rules of origin are designed in a way
which maximizes protectionist interests of domestic producers. In a world
of global supply chains and multi-located production, this protectionist
design often takes a huge toll on both domestic economy and international
trade. The manipulative, and messy,160 rules of origin in most RTAs, often
dubbed “spaghetti bowls,”161 have deprived many developing countries of
their comparative advantages stemming from both their natural endowments
(such as good quality raw materials) and cheap labor.
For example, Mexican textile producers are not eligible for a duty
free access to the U.S. market under NAFTA if they source the Indian yarns
for their production: they are required to use those yarns from NAFTA
countries (the “yarn-forward” rule).162 Undoubtedly, such a quixotic rule
goes against the spirit of free trade since it strips Mexican textile producers,
Indian yarn producers and American textile consumers of considerable
Revised
April
2004,
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legal/informed_compliance_pubs/icp006r3.ctt/i
cp006r3.pdf
157
See Annex 401 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
158
See notably Moshe Hirsch, International Trade Law, Political Economy, and
Rules of Origin: A Plea for a Reform of the WTO Regime on Rules of Origin, 36 J. WORLD
TRADE 171, 177-81 (2002).
159
In this regard, the legal vacuum under the current WTO system over rules of
origin is unfortunate. / “no oversight” given that regional mercantilism had been prevalent
during the Uruguay Round negotiations Hirsch (JWT), pp 183-84; BERNARD HOEKMAN &
MICHEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 104
(1995).
160
They are often more than 100 pages long! See the Mexico-Japan FTA has over
100 pages of rules of origin under the title of the “Annex 4 referred to in Chapter 4:
Specific Rules of Origin.”
161
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECTIONS ON
TRADE, IMMIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 290 (1998).
162
19 U.S.C. § 3332 (1998). Interestingly, Customs has advised that the yarn
forward rule is not a “rule”. NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) for
Textiles and Textile Articles, Informed Compliance Document, 1996 WL 769281 (1996).
See also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
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economic welfare.163
On top of this idiosyncratic nature, the origin rules themselves in
general are so complicated and unintelligible, rife with “a facade of
technical and seemingly innocuous details.”164 The textile rules of origin in
the U.S.-Jordan FTA165 offer a case in point. The following is an excerpt
from the FTA.
9. Textile and apparel products
(a) General rule. A textile or apparel product shall be considered to
be wholly the growth, product or manufacture of a Party, or a new or
different article of commerce that has been grown, produced, or
manufactured in a Party; only if
(i) the product is wholly obtained or produced in a Party;
(ii) the product is a yarn, thread, twine, cordage, rope, cable,
or braiding, and,
(1) the constituent staple fibers are spun in that Party,
or
(2) the continuous filament is extruded in that Party;
(iii) the product is a fabric, including a fabric classified under
chapter 59 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, and the constituent fibers, filaments, or
yarns are woven, knitted, needled, tufted, felted, entangled,
or transformed by any other fabric-making process in that
Party; or
(iv) the product is any other textile or apparel product that is
wholly assembled in that Party from its component pieces.
(b) Special rules.
(i) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a)(iv), and except as
provided in subparagraphs (b)(iii) and (b)(iv), whether this
Agreement shall apply to a good that is classified under one
163

See Sungjoon Cho, Change Distorted Rules, 5/7/2007 NAT’L L. J. 27 (2007).
Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 401, 410 (2002).
165
US-Jordan FTA Annex 2.2 http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/us-jrd/anx22.asp
(emphasis added) [hereinafter USJFTA, Annex 2.2].
164
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of the following HTS headings or subheadings shall be
determined under subparagraphs (i), (ii), or (iii) of
subparagraph (a), as appropriate: 5609, 5807, 5811,
6209.20.50.40, 6213, 6214, 6301, 6302, 6304, 6305, 6306,
6307.10, 6307.90, 6308, or 9404.90.
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a)(iv), and except as
provided in subparagraphs (b)(iii) and (b)(iv), this
Agreement shall apply to a textile or apparel product which
is knit to shape in a Party.
(iii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a)(iv), this Agreement
shall apply to goods classified under HTS heading 6117.10,
6213.00, 6214.00, 6302.22, 6302.29, 6302.52, 6302.53,
6302.59, 6302.92, 6302.93, 6302.99, 6303.92, 6303.99,
6304.19, 6304.93, 6304.99, 9404.90.85, or 9404.90.95,
except for goods classified under such headings as of cotton
or of wool or consisting of fiber blends containing 16 percent
or more by weight of cotton, if the fabric in the goods is both
dyed and printed, when such dyeing and printing is
accompanies by 2 or more of the following finishing
operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping, decating,
permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent embossing, or
moireing.
(iv) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a)(iii), this Agreement
shall apply to fabric classified under the HTS as of silk,
cotton, man-made fiber, or vegetable fiber if the fabric is
both dyed and printed in a Party, and such dyeing and
printing is accompanied by 2 or more of the following
finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping,
decating, permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent
embossing, or moireing.
(…)166
As is widely documented, most textile products are nowadays
manufactured in global supply chains. Producers can now execute various
production processes, such as weaving, knitting and needling, in multiple
countries in a way which optimizes their logistical needs.167 Therefore, a
166
167

Id.
Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås, The Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORS

21-Aug-12]

Are World Trading Rules Passé?

35

Jordanian textile producer might want to ship half-finished products to an
African country to complete the rest of the production stage with a lower
wage cost and then ship final products back to Jordan. However, to benefit
from the duty-free access to the U.S. market under the FTA, the
“constituent fibers, filaments, or yarns [must be] woven, knitted, needled,
tufted, felted, entangled, or transformed by any other fabric-making
process”168 in nowhere but Jordan. Therefore, to the extent that the
Jordanian producers must comply with these eccentric rules of origin they
are deprived of better business opportunities, such as outsourcing. They
might be exempted from these taxing requirements, only if they satisfy
other stringent conditions, i.e., if they trade “silk, cotton, man-made fiber,
or vegetable fiber” products, and if “the fabric in the goods is both dyed and
printed, when such dyeing and printing is accompanies by two or more of
the following finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping,
decating, permanent stiffening, weighting, permanent embossing, or
moireing.”169 In sum, these rules of origin exist not to create but to
suppress trade. They are a relic from the mercantilist system because they
served the function of protecting the benefit of the negotiated bargain.
However, since nearly every country is entitled to MFN, the nonpreferential rules no longer serve that need in any meaningful way.170 The
preferential rules of origin are overtly mercantilist. Just keeping track of
inputs so that a country of origin determination can be made adds
significant cost.
While one can point to other uses for country of origin rules
(“marking” for example), we would argue that these functions serve
questionable ends. For example, many countries require not only that a
country of origin determination be made for the purposes of tariff treatment,
but also that imported products be marked so that the ultimate purchaser
know the country of origin. But even assuming that purchasers care enough
about the country of origin determination to bear the added costs, for any
product where value is added in more than one country the marking will be
misleading.
Imagine a manufacturer of bath and beauty products. It may have
hundreds of products with thousands of components and it is possible that
each component could be sourced from more than one, and perhaps several,
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, WTO Discussion Paper No. 5, at 8 (2004).
168
USJFTA, Annex 2.2, supra note 165 (emphasis added).
169
Id. (emphasis added).
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locations. Assume, as is likely the case, that all of the components originate
wholly from WTO member countries and no matter what the country of
origin determination the product will be entitled to the same rate of duty.
That importer will nonetheless have to keep track of each component, even
though its choice of where to source the component is likely driven by
pricing, timing, and availability, rather than country origin marking
requirements. And even if purchasers of the product might care about the
origin of the product and might not want a product from a particular
country, the country of origin marking is not necessarily telling her what
she thinks. "Made in France" does not mean that there are no components
from China or Turkey or El Salvador. Lastly, this manufacturer, desiring a
certain label of origin, i.e. Made in France, might distort its behavior just
enough to acquire that label. So you can have a manufacturer distorting
comparative advantage principles to obtain a label that stands a good chance
of being misleading.
We believe that the outdated rules of origin stem from a
fundamental conception of trade that simply no longer holds true: the
single-country production model.
Only when negotiators and policy
makers break free of this framework will we be able to cast off the weight
of these anachronistic rules.
III. MODERNIZING GLOBAL TRADING RULES: A CASE FOR TRADE NETWORKS
As discussed above, the ever-salient multi-location production
patterns and the increasingly obsolete notion of reciprocity render the
conventional top-down treaty-making approach ill-equipped in addressing
new complex problems such as transfer pricing or reform of the country of
origin rules. Here, a bottom-up approach, such as trade networks, merits
serious consideration as an alternative mode of norm-making. First of all,
the state-centric model of negotiation easily stalls when the political stakes
are involved. Changes that require breaking the mercantilist frame is often
politically infeasible. Second, these are complex issues that span multiple
issue areas (e.g. tax and customs, or economics and statistics). Groups of
problem solvers well-versed in these issue areas will be necessary to
develop nimble yet nuanced approaches. In the transfer pricing arena we
have already seen tax and customs professionals – from governments,
international organizations, and private businesses – working in a variety of
venues to solve the conundrum. We can also identify a similar phenomenon
in a trade statistics network, which, although not directly aimed at country
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of origin rules reform, clearly lays the groundwork for such reform.
A.

Trade Networks as a Bottom-Up Approach

The anachronism of some trade rules necessitates a prompt policy
response. However, the conventional method of international cooperation
in the trade regime, treaty-making, does not appear to offer a workable
solution here. First, even after six decades of trade liberalization a
mercantilist specter still haunts the domestic politics in major countries.171
In particular, amid the crisis-borne recession, trade policies remain
politically sensitive issues: exports and imports are loaded terms these
days.172 This is a barren environment in which one might not expect any
political capital necessary to launch and sustain negotiations with a view to
amending the relevant WTO agreements on the customs regulation.
Moreover, disentangling the labyrinthine rules rife with incomprehensible
technicalities via trade negotiation is questionable.173 One should not
negotiate over what one could not understand. Even if negotiators could
somehow deliver a newly harmonized set of customs rules, they might be
equally unintelligible.174
171

Mercantilism in Latin America, Fin. Times, March 20, 2012 available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/878bab8a-729d-11e1-9c2300144feab49a.html#axzz235FGL9Kc; Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth: How Global
Economic Integration Renders Trade Policy Obsolete, Trade Policy Analysis, Cato
Institute, Dec. 2, 2009 at 9 available at http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policyanalysis/made-earth-how-global-economic-integration-renders-trade-policy-obsolete;
Annie Lowrey, An Increase in Barriers to Trade Is Reported, N.Y. Times (June 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/business/global/rise-in-trade-protectionism-is-notedby-the-wto.html. European Commission, Press Release, EU sounds alarm over sharp rise in
protectionism
across
G20
(June
6,
2012),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=804. Paul Taylor, In France, Old
Protectionist
Idea
Reawakened,
N.Y.
Times
(Apr.
18,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/business/global/19inside.html.
172
See e.g., Protectionism Concerns Intensify as G-20 Summit Approaches, 16
Bridges Wkly Trade News Update, No. 22, Jun. 6, 2012 (quoting the WTO DirectorGeneral Pascal Lamy who warned against “a clear revival of protectionist rhetoric” in
recent times).
173
The need for “administrative simplicity” but “negotiability” (hard to negotiate)
Patricia Augier et al., The Impact of Rules of Origin on Trade Flows, Economic Policy 567,
603 (2005).
174
Henry Wai‐chung Yeung, Organising Regional Production Networks in Southeast
Asia: Implications for Production Fragmentation, Trade, and Rules of Origin, 1 J ECON
GEOGR (2001), 299, 315 (2001); W. Keizer, Negotiations on Harmonized Non-Preferential
Rules of Origin: A Useless Task from a Trade Policy Perspective?, 31 J. WORLD TRADE
145, 149-50 (1997); Antoni Estevadeordal et al., Multilateralizing Preferential Rules of
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Even assuming the political will and technical expertise, the nature
of some problems are not suitable for treaty-based solutions; they need
more holistic and nuanced treatment. Sometimes, as is the case with rules
of origin, the complex customs regulations are themselves “non-tariff
barriers".175 Reciprocal bargains cannot adequately address these barriers
because they cannot be mutually cancelled off as tariffs can. Only customs
professionals can decipher those mercantilist terms behind innocuously
sounding provisions. At the same time, only through epistemic dialogue
they can better understand different regulatory positions of the other parties.
This mutual understanding begets mutual trust, which can translate into
regulatory toleration, if not a full-blown harmonization.176 Trade networks
are instrumentally more suitable to address the complex trade problems
emerging as a result of the global factory.
For the purpose of this Article, a trade network is defined as a
“hybrid” of public and private networks composed of customs officials on
the one hand, and private lawyers, academics and transnational businesses
on the other. It is a conceptual expansion of government networks or
transgovernmental regulatory networks (TRNs).177 A TRN is composed of
like-minded working-level professionals who share the common belief in
regulatory problems and responses across the state lines.178 It is a process,
rather than an entity: what matters is that those networkers (professionals)
continuously interact and communicate with each other, not necessarily that
they are affiliated with a distinct institutional form.179 A trade network is a
hybrid in that those networkers include both public (regulators) and private
players (regulatees). Based on shared knowledge and concerns on
particular technical issues, these networkers as “policy entrepreneurs”180
may generate certain soft law, i.e., regulatory prototypes in the form of
guidelines and recommendations, which can both reflect and guide their
future behaviors in this area. In fact, many scholars have already
Origin around the World, Conference Paper Prepared for the WTO/HEI/NCCR
Trade/CEPR Conference (“Multilateralizing Regionalism”), Sep. 2007, at 53.
175
http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=814
176
See generally David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets and
Globalization (2010) (introducing the notion of "commitment pathway" that prioritizes the
commitment in regulatory engagement over actual output of convergence)
177
See Cho and Kelly, supra note 18, at 501 (discussing networks).
178
Id.
179
Id., at 503-04 (discussing the importance of day to day interactions).
180
JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 188-93 (2d ed.,
1997).
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documented this network-driven soft norm-making process, in particular in
the area of banking regulation.181 In the long-term, these network activities
may pave groundwork for possible hard law-making, i.e., treaty
amendments.182
B.

Transfer Pricing Networks

In response to the aforementioned transfer pricing challenges,
networks of regulatory officials, business lawyers and international actors
have emerged. First, private actors struggled at the national level to deal
with a variety of transfer pricing challenges. These efforts then spread
internationally to a variety of organizations including the OECD and WCO,
which in turn provided guidance to national regulators with input from
those regulators and private attorneys.
The earliest initiatives to deal with the complexities of related party
transfer pricing issues came from the private sector tax professionals.
Taxpayers and professionals approached the IRS in the United States to
establish the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) Program as a means to
settle transfer pricing issues outside an adversarial process.183 The program
began in 1991.184 Essentially an APA is a transfer pricing study, a
document that establishes the appropriate methodology to determine the
transfer price between entities over a period of time. An APA is an
agreement between the IRS and a taxpayer. The transfer pricing study
methodology may allow for certain adjustments that can result in increases
or decreases to the price depending on different variables. The taxing
authority and the taxpayer agree upon a methodology in advance and in a
non-adversarial setting. 185
While taxing authorities in the United States and elsewhere routinely
181

See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 261-62 (2011); Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in
International Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 460-61 (2008).
182
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INTL L 1, 81 (2002).
183
Announcement and Report Concerning Advance Pricing Agreements, Issued
Pursuant to Pub. L. 106-170, Section 521(b) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/a00-35.pdf
184
Id.
185
See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 et se. The IRS has set out its procedures for APAs in two
Revenue Procedures. Rev. Proc. 2008-31, 2008-23 I.R.B. 1133, at 1. Rev. Proc. 2006-9,
2006-1 C.B. 278, at 1.
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accepted transfer pricing studies as binding agreements as to value, customs
authorities did not for a variety of reasons. Customs’ rejection of APA (not
always, but often) stemmed from its fundamentally different perspectives
on transfer pricing.186 Customs authorities in the United States and
elsewhere sought to identify the correct “transaction” value for each single
importation of merchandise.187 The Valuation Agreement which binds all
WTO members speaks to valuation of related-party sales and requires that it
approximate certain test values, the most important of which is transaction
value.188 Transaction value is defined by the Agreement as the price “that is
the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the
country of importation”189 with certain adjustments. Thus, customs value is
conceived of a single price paid or payable for a product. The customs
office must ensure that such a price be correct for each transaction.
Therefore, an artificial value that an APA formula creates is seemingly
inconsistent with the Valuation Agreement’s preference for a price per
transaction. Thus, in the United States Customs, for example, regularly
held that a transfer price study alone was insufficient to validate a relatedparty transfer price.190
On the other hand, however, tax law practitioners consider the
customs’ refusal as unfair, especially in the face of Section 1059A.
Customs authorities appraise value at the time of importation. While
customs regulations in the United States allow for importers to employ
formulas to determine customs value, those formulas were only acceptable
when the indeterminate variables are beyond the control of the parties (e.g.,
currency fluctuations).191 Where the parties control the variables as they
often do in APAs, then subsequent reductions in prices are considered post
importation “rebates” which are irrelevant for customs valuation.
Therefore, typical post importation decreases in value under an APA would
be precluded under Section 1059A.
In short, APAs allowed taxpayers and tax authorities to work out a
186

Customs Valuation: Transaction Value and Related Parties, Customs and Int'l
Trade Alert (Blank Rome LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2008, available at
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=1685
187
19 C.F.R. § 152.103 (2012).
188
Marrakesh Valuation Agreement, supra note 119, art. 1.
189
Id.
190
Headquarters Ruling Letter (HRL) 546998 dated January 19, 2000 (explaining that
a transfer pricing study alone is insufficient to support a transfer price).
191
See 19 CFR §152.103(a); 2011 U.S. CUSTOM HQ LEXIS 272 (U.S. CUSTOM
HQ 2011).
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mutually acceptable transfer price formulas. If customs authorities would
accept such a formula, many of the conflicts between most tax and customs
regimes would go away. The timing of valuation would not be a problem
because the valuation would be constructed using a formula that recognized
that some variable of the formula might occur post-importation. The
differences in methodologies would be resolved because the agreement
would provide the formula. Most importantly, however, the ability to use a
formula would allow customs value to capture post-importation variables so
that a tax basis would not be artificially limited by Section 1059A, as
discussed above.192 The problem was how to get customs officials in the
United States and elsewhere to re-conceive their approach to valuation. The
solution was networks.
Networks emerged nationally and internationally on this issue.
Many other jurisdictions had the same or similar rules to the United States,
causing significant headaches for MNEs who sought relief from national
regulators and attracted the attention of other national jurisdictions and the
WCO and the OECD. Tax professionals and customs practitioners first
worked on a case by case basis to convince regulators to accept agreed upon
valuations for tax and customs purposes. Accounting and law firms
regularly petitioned national customs authorities to accept prices established
through APAs as valid transactions values.193 Bar associations held
programs exploring the need to reconcile the tension between tax and
customs valuation.194 Efforts were made to establish norms reflecting this
agreements and pressure was added by the efforts of the OECD and
WCO.195 The process was incremental.
The WCO Committee on Customs Valuation (CCV) and the
Technical Committee on Customs Valuation worked closely with the
OECD and private partners to address transfer pricing and the lack of
192

See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See 2000 U.S. CUSTOM HQ LEXIS 688 (U.S. CUSTOM HQ 2000)(successful);
2002 U.S. CUSTOM HQ LEXIS 1012 (U.S. CUSTOM HQ 2002)(unsuccessful).
194
See e.g., ABA Tax Meeting, Committee on Transfer Pricing, available at
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/TX357000/sitesofinterest_files/2009_
Midyear_Meeting_Handout_2nd_Hour.pdf; Advanced Singapore Summit On Asia
Customs
Compliance
available
at
http://www.americanconference.com/2011/968/advanced-singapore-summit-on-asiacustoms-compliance/workshop
195
Second Joint WCO-OECD Conference on Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/2.%20Event%20files/PDFs/Valeur/Conference%20Brochure
.pdf (Second Joint Conference calling for national tax and customs authorities to
coordinate).
193
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consistent treatment between taxing and customs authorities. 196 In 2006
and 2007, the OECD and the WCO formed a Joint Focus Group on Transfer
Pricing addressing both tax and customs valuation issues. 197 For example
the 2007 Meeting of the Focus Group on Transfer Pricing recommended:
Consideration of the Customs valuation treatment of situations
where a Transfer Pricing agreement indicates that the declared Customs
value will be adjusted as necessary at a later date to achieve a predetermined profit margin (known as price review clauses). 198
This group enlisted the help of industry as well199 and encouraged
augmented dialogue between the customs and tax administrations. 200 The
OECD and the WCO sponsored conferences on the transfer pricing issue in
an effort to improve certainty for businesses. As a result of these meetings,
in 2011 the WCO endorsed efforts to link tax and customs transfer pricing.
201
Specifically, in Commentary 23.1 to the Valuation Agreement, the
WCO “provide guidance on the use of a transfer pricing study, prepared in
accordance with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and provided by
importers as a basis for examining “the circumstances surrounding the
sale”, under Article 1.2 (a) of the Agreement.” 202 It concluded that customs
authorities should be willing to consider transfer pricing studies on a case
by case basis. These efforts have built off of private sector and national
regulatory efforts to confront transfer pricing challenges and they
themselves are now influencing national regulatory regimes.
196

Joint WCO-OECD Conference on Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation, OECD
(April
24,
2006),
http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3746,en_2649_33753_36541927_1_1_1_1,00.html
197
Meeting of the Focus Group on Transfer Pricing, Summary of the Proceedings,
WCO
(October
26,
2007),
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Valuation/Recom
mendations_Transfer_Pricing_pub(E).pdf [Hereinafter ‘Recommendations Transfer
Pricing’].
198
Id., at 2.
199
Id (“Members of the Focus Group from the Private Sector could contribute to
TCCV discussions on these issues, via the ICC or by the invitation of the Chairperson”).
200
Id (“Greater dialogue between the Customs and Tax administrations to be
encouraged”).
201
World Customs Organization: Converging Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation
Rules, KPMG TAX NEWS FLASH (June 20, 2011),
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/taxnewsflash/Customs/2011/Jun/TNFTC11_253.html.
202
Examination of the Expression “Circumstances Surrounding the Sale” Under
Article 1.2 (a) in Relation to the Use of Transfer Pricing Studies, WCO, 1 (October 2010),
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/Valuation/Comme
ntary_23.1.pdf.
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Recently, the U.S. customs office revoked its long standing ruling
which prohibited post-importation downward adjustments in transfer
pricing cases. 203 As indicated above, U.S. customs office had long held
that it would not accept a value (as a transaction value) which was based on
a non-objective formula (as are many APA values). 204 In issuing its new
ruling, it now allows for the use of APAs (under certain circumstances) as
the basis for customs values. Critically, a treaty did not bring this rather
dramatic policy change. It was none but a set of various transfer pricing
networks which created a new norm in this technical area.
C.

Trade Statistics Networks

A compilation of actors have made meaningful progress to break
free from the single-country production model and formed what may be
coined the trade statistics network. In comparison with the previous
transfer pricing network, the trade statistics network is in an earlier stage in
its formation and thus much looser in its organization. It may better be
coined a “proto-network,” rather than a full-blown network. Nonetheless, it
certainly demonstrates some common attributes of a network. This network
of actors includes members of international organizations such as the
United Nations (UN), the OECD, and the WTO, national regulators (for
example the United States Commerce Department, quasi-governmental
agencies such as the Japan External Trade Organization, academics and
civil society (participants in the World Input Output Database). 205 This
network has been working to re-conceptualize how we measure and present
trade statistics. 206 A necessary first step in this work is shifting from a
“trade in goods” framework to a “trade in tasks” framework, a shift that has
significant implications for outdated rules of origin and their tradedistorting effect, as discussed above. 207
The trade statistic network has its origins in the work of several
203

Notice of Revocation of a Ruling Letter HQ 547654 Relating to Post-Importation
Adjustments; Transfer Pricing; Related Party Transactions; Reconciliation, 46 Cust. B. &
Dec. 1, 2 (May 16, 2012); 2012 WL 2339437, at *2 (May 16, 2012).
204
See id. at 2.
205
WTO and OECD to Develop Statistics on Trade in Value Added, WTO NEWS ITEMS
(March, 15 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/miwi_15mar12_e.htm.
206
Id.
207
Made in the World; Message from the Director-General Pascal Lamy, WTO MIWI
HOMEPAGE (April 4, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm.
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international organizations. The United Nations Statistical Commission208
both standardizes and collects statistical information on international trade
as well as a number of other topics. 209 Working with the WTO in 1995, the
Statistical Commission generated a report entitled "National reporting
practices in International Merchandise Trade Statistics"210 and sought to
revise its “International Trade Statistics: Concepts and Definitions” in
connection with a number of goals, including the WTO and the WCO’s
work on the rules of origin. 211
More recently, the EU sponsored the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) as part of the 7th Framework Program, on Socio-Economic
Sciences and Humanities. The WIOD is dedicated “analy[zing] the effects
of globalization on trade patterns, environmental pressures and socioeconomic development across a wide set of countries.” 212 The WTO,
partnered with the OECD, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the
World Bank, the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) and the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO), plans to modernize trade statistics in
a way that takes account of globalization and moves away from bilateral
notions of trade. 213
The WTO brought the issue to the public’s attention with its “Made
208

UN Statistical Commission, UNSD HOMEPAGE,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/commission.htm. (last visited July 15, 2012)
(Established in 1947 the Commission has 24 elected UN member countries).
209
The United Nations Statistics Division, UNSD ABOUT US,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/aboutus.htm. (last visited July 15, 2012).
210
International Merchandise Trade Statistics National Compilation and Reporting
Practices: Survey Results 2006 and 1996 Introduction, UNSD (JULY 25, 2008),
HTTP://UNSTATS.UN.ORG/UNSD/TRADEREPORT/INTRODUCTION_MM.ASP.
211
See id. (Textual footnote on IMTS 2010 and revised Compilers manual).
212
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD), WIOD (July 6, 2012),
http://www.wiod.org/database/index.htm (accessed by clicking “Database” on the toolbar
at the top of the WIOD homepage). (In April of 2012, the WIOD made its database
available to the public for the analysis of the data it had accumulated. This information
came from 27 EU Countries and 13 others from across the world, excluding Africa.
European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. North America: Canada, United States. Latin America:
Brazil, Mexico. Asia and Pacific: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan,
Turkey, Indonesia, Russia).
213
Richard A. McCormack, Everything is ‘Made in the World’: WTO is One Step
Closer to Eliminating Country-Of-Origin Labels, MANUFACTURING NEWS (May 14, 2012),
http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/madeintheworld514121.html.
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in the World Initiative.” In October of 2010, Director-General Pascal Lamy
gave a speech to the French Senate in which he coined the phrase “Made in
the World” as a way to differentiate the system of measuring value added
by country, rather than using the current system of country of origin
labeling. During the speech, he referred to a 2009 report published by the
French Senate which stated, “traditional measurement of foreign trade alone
no longer suffices to explain how [the country] fits into the world
economy”. 214 Concerned with how advocates for state sovereignty might
be concerned with a(nother) system of global governance for international
trade, Lamy said, “…we are certainly not “deconstructing” the national and
international statistical system or “displacing” certain elements of that
system. On the contrary, we are trying to “relocate” and “reorganize” in a
more integrated context the sparse information available today…”215 This
statement reflects the WTO’s support of the activities of the WIOD and
similar regional projects directed at reaching a critical mass of new statistics
on trade flows, with careful attention paid to value add at each stage in the
global supply chain.
During the course of 2011, Director-General Lamy and others
within the WTO began pushing this notion of “Made in the World” and
evaluating trade based on value added rather than country of origin. At the
Global Forum on Trade Statistics in February of 2011, leaders from the
WTO posed the question to trade statisticians from all over the world, as to
whether current measurements of trade (based on country of origin)
adequately reflected the “new reality of global production.” 216 In June
2011, when announcing the WTO and IDE-JETRO publication “Trade
Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia,” Lamy emphasized the core
message of the book and the philosophy behind it: “by focusing on gross
values of exports and imports, traditional trade statistics give us a distorted
picture of trade imbalances between countries”; “The picture would be
different if we took account of how much domestic value-added is
embedded in these flows.” 217 It was also at this point that the WTO
announced the launch of it’s “Made in the World” website, devoted to
214

Lamy Says More and More Products are ‘Made in the World’, WTO NEWS
(October 15, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl174_e.htm
215
Id.
216
Opening Statement by DDG Alejandro Jara: Global Forum on Trade Statistics,
WTO, 5 (February 3, 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/forum_feb11_e/jara_e.pdf.
217
Lamy Suggests ‘Trade in Value-Added’ as a Better Measurement of World Trade,
WTO NEWS (June 6, 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/miwi_06jun11_e.htm.
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facilitating dialogue on this growing concept of new measurements of
international trade, now guided by the WTO.
By the end of 2011, a broad consensus began to emerge around the
notion of measuring international trade based on value added, rather than
country of origin. 218 In particular, the APEC Conference on using inputoutput tables for economic modeling was a significant landmark in this
regard. It successfully transferred the concepts introduced by the WTO,
JETRO, WIOD, and other policy organizations into the hands of finance
ministers from major economies. However, the political concerns of such a
major shift in trade policy somewhat eclipsed this success. Participants in
the conference agreed to move forward in “incremental ways,” 219 indicating
that progress may be possible in the future, but almost certainly not in the
near term.
The WIOD and the larger WTO initiative take notice of the global
nature of supply chains and the difficulty in determining a country of origin
for products with elements drawn from a multitude of countries before their
final sale. The WTO in promoting its “Made in the World,” initiative has
said that "attributing the full commercial value of imports to the last country
of origin can skew bilateral trade balances, pervert the political debate on
trade imbalances and may lead to wrong and counter-productive
decisions."220 By seeking to alter or eliminate the current system of country
of origin labels, the WTO appears to be attempting to reframe the issue of
global trade in a way to avoid many of the political pitfalls associated with
products labeled as “Made in XXXX.” Now even some politicians have
begun to echo this revelation. Karel De Gucht, the European Commissioner
for Trade, speaking at the WIOD conference this past April, criticized the
current labeling scheme when he said it “is a bit like the final runner in a
relay team getting a gold medal while his team-mates get silver and bronze.
It doesn't take account of the fact that the final result is the product of a joint
effort.”221
218

APEC Conference “Building APEC Economies’ Capacities of Employing InputOutput Tables for Advanced Economic Modeling”, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STATISTICAL EDUCATION, (November 24-25, 2011), http://miso.hse.ru/en/2011apec.
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The new conceptualization of trade and in particular the shift to
trade in task has many legal and non legal implications. First, as a practical
matter, the new framework may simply be just a better reflection of what is
actually going on in the world. Second, the new cognitive framework that
provides policy makers with useful information regarding nations trading
partners. For example, while the U.S. trade balance in iPhones vis-à-vis
China in 2009 under the traditional trade statistical model is approximately
minus $2 billion, the new model based on value added is merely minus $73
million, most reflecting labor costs incurred in China.222 In fact, certain
shared epistemic grounds have already existed over this particular issue.223
The work of the trade statistics network has opened a new way to
thinking about country of origin. The trade statistics network can help
break the conceptual single country production frame. Once that frame is
broken, policy makers can assess the value or current country of origin
determination and perhaps adopt new ones that better reflect the true origins
of products.

April 16, 2012. Both De Gucht and WTO Deputy Director General Alejandro Jara,
speaking at the April conference, took the position that the improved statistics would help
demonstrate to countries of the fallacy of the notion that more imports mean a weak
economy, or more exports a strong economy. In an attempt to rail against this antiquated
and mercantilist concept of trade, one journalist referred to the oft-mentioned example of
the iPhone as an example of a product “Made in China” but only a small fraction of the its
value is added there, compared to a much larger share in the United States, as the home of
Apple.
http://www.just-style.com/comment/is-garment-production-cominghome_id114354.aspx?d=1
222
Andreas Maurer, Trade in Value Added: What Is the Country of Origin in an
Interconnected World?, Apr. 20, 2011 (WTO: Made in the World site).
223
See e.g., Daniel Ikenson, Lies, Damned Lies and Trade Statistics, Dec. 16, 2010,
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/lies-damned-lies-and-trade-statistics/ (observing that global
economic integration calls for a new way of understanding trade statistics based on , valueadded); Greg Linden et al., Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System: The Case
of Apple’s iPod, June 2007, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1770046n#page-1 (warning that
trade statistics can mislead the public); Yuqing Xing & Neal Detert, How iPhone Widens
the US Trade Deficits with PRC, GRIPS Discussion Paper 10-21 (Nov. 2010) (concluding
that traditional trade statistics tends to inflate bilateral trade deficits between a
manufacturing platform country (such as China) and its destination countries (such as the
United States); WTO, Lamy Says More and More Products Are “Made in the World,”
WTO News, Oct. 15, 2010 (arguing that WTO members should embrace a new way of
understanding (“debilateraliz[ing]”) trade statistics in an era of “multi-located” production
based on added values in each stage of production).
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D. Using Trade Networks to Cast Off the Remnants of Mercantilism
The existence of the transfer pricing network and the trade statistics
networks offers more than an anecdotal account of bottom-up, issuespecific problem solving. These trade networks can offer opportunities to
re-conceptualize trade rules free from mercantilist dispositions. This reconceptualization in turn presents a more holistic account of the problems
that trade rules must address. Some problems are ill-served by a process
that excludes or marginalizes various non-state actors. Networks provide
access to lawyers, academics, civil society and business interests. Networks
focus more on problem solving rather than quid pro quo trading for gains.
Networks bring actors together from a variety of issue areas.
The consultative nature of networks allows them to holistically
approach complex problems. Network regulators develop approaches,
principles, standards. The fact that they are not developing hard law frees
them to incrementally develop norms over time with all different types of
actors, from private enterprises to civil society or with other network actors.
In fact, it is this lack of strong “accountability” to any particular group that
has been leveled as a criticism of networks. But it is also one of the
strengths of networks. The flexibility of networks to consult a wide array of
policy makers and other problem solvers can allow them to look at a
problem holistically. Thus, norm entrepreneurs from both the tax and
customs background, be they academics, business people or governmental
officials, may hang together to creatively think about complex policy
challenges such as transfer pricing issues. Likewise, statisticians and
economists may work with trade lawyers to confront the changing patterns
of trade.
Networks, as problem solvers, do not focus on a reciprocal bargain,
but rather on facilitating business more generally. State to state negotiation
of trade has typically concerned itself with reciprocal concessions. For
example, lower tariffs on various products can be traded. Some problems
do not lend themselves to such bargaining. The conflict between national
tax authorities and customs authorities is not a problem that requires a
bargain – it is a problem that requires a dialogue. Other emerging trade
issues involving trade facilitation, or standards harmonization, likewise
need these kinds of discursive solutions, not necessarily negotiated
concessions. Networks are well-equipped to provide these discursive
opportunities.
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Networks are also better suited at confronting development
problems. The complexity and variety of global supply chains call for
adequate government policies, in particular by developing countries, to
overcome the “logistics gap” and harness such chains for their
developmental needs.224 According to a recent study commissioned by
World Bank logistics specialists, Morocco was able to better capitalize on
its geographical proximity to Europe to obtain better access to the European
market by implementing a comprehensive program to advance its trade
logistics.
Reforming border management in conjunction with large
infrastructure investments in the Tangier-Med Port facilitated its “just-intime” exports to Europe, in particular for its strategic sectors, such as auto
parts, electronics and textiles. Morocco’s achievement is testimonial to the
potential of logistics reform in terms of economic growth and development
for developing countries.225
Admittedly, networks will not replace state to state negotiation of
concessions. Nor will they replace the state created hard law embodied in
treaties. Nonetheless, networks can certainly complement the conventional
rulemaking process and provide an avenue in which to handle new,
complicated trade-regulatory problems and challenges.
CONCLUSION
Importantly, trade anachronism leaves its trace also in the current
pedagogical divide between (public) international trade law and (private)
international business transactions. Basically as a statist curriculum that
addresses state-to-state legal relations on trade affairs, International Trade
Law seldom discusses what actually constitutes international trade, such as
sales, distribution and marketing. Therefore, this state-oriented structure of
International Trade Law, although faithful to the traditional public
international law framework, has increasingly become inadequate in fully
capturing, and governing, contemporary international commerce.
In this regard, the WTO as an institution should redouble its efforts
to reach out to those micro players, such as retailers and consumers, who
collectively comprise the global trading system. Social marketing should be
an important tool for the WTO to connect the aforementioned public/private
224

Jean-François Arvis et al., Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the
Global Economy iii (2012).
225
Id., at 2.
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divide. With more direct presence, and participation, of these individual
actors in the WTO decision-making process, its anachronistic trading norms
can change, not necessarily in a traditional top-down fashion (such as
treaty-making) but rather in a diffused, bottom-up manner (such as
networking). Importantly, this paradigm shift will also transform the nature
of trading norms, from a fiat to a communication manual. To trading
nations and traders alike, this manual will assist them in mapping out their
optimal economic activities, rather than normatively boxing them in.
Eventually, this new norm-making, and subsequently norm-sponsoring,
process will construct the WTO as the true global trading community.

